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On the priming of risk preferences: The role of fear and general affect 
 
Despoina Alempaki, Chris Starmer, Fabio Tufano† 
 
Abstract: Priming is an established tool in psychology for investigating aspects of cognitive processes 
underlying decision making and is increasingly applied in economics. We report a systematic attempt 
to test the reproducibility and generalisability of priming effects on risk attitudes in a more diverse 
population than professionals and students, when priming using either a positive or a negative 
experience. We further test fear as the causal mechanism underlying countercyclical risk aversion. 
Across a series of experiments with a total sample of over 1900 participants, we are unable to find any 
systematic effect of priming on risk preferences. Moreover, our results challenge the role of fear as the 
mechanism underlying countercyclical risk aversion; we find evidence of an impact of general affect 
such that the better our participants feel, the more risk they take. 
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On the priming of risk preferences: The role of fear and general affect 
 
1. Introduction  
Over at least three decades, priming research – using subtle cues that unconsciously influence people’s 
behaviour – has become a well-established area of study in social psychology (e.g., Molden, 2014). 
More recently, the use of priming techniques has started to feature in economics (see Cohn and 
Maréchal, 2016, for a review) including prominent work demonstrating the apparent malleability of risk 
preferences (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2010).  Indeed, a substantial number of studies in psychology, 
economics and finance have shown that making negative (positive) experiences mentally salient, via 
priming, decreases (increases) subsequent risk taking behaviour. For example, Erb et al. (2002) alter 
risky behaviour of students by asking them to rank the frequency of occurrence, in everyday language, 
of adjectives with risk-averse or risk-seeking connotations and show that this effect may be quite 
enduring. Gilad and Kliger (2008) find that the behaviour of both financial professionals and students 
is affected by priming them using short, risk averse or risk seeking vignettes, although the effect is more 
pronounced for the professionals. Cohn et al. (2015) show that priming financial professionals to bring 
to mind a stock market crash significantly decreases their risk taking compared to when primed with a 
stock market boom.1 They further investigate the causal mechanism through which priming influences 
risk preferences and provide evidence for fearful emotions being the channel underlying such 
“countercyclical” risk aversion (see also Callen et al., 2014; Guiso et al., 2013); as such, this finding 
contributes to a substantial literature investigating relationships between emotions and risk taking both 
in economics (e.g., Hirshleifer and Tyler, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2003) and in psychology (e.g., Hockey 
et al., 2000; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001).2 
 As part of this growing literature, however, some writers have challenged the replicability or 
generalisability of priming effects.3 For instance, evidence from cognitive psychology (see Shanks et 
al., 2013) suggests that unconscious influences of priming techniques may be both modest and very 
short-lived (less than a second).  Recent meta-analyses of priming studies indicate that available 
evidence may be subject to small-study effects and publication bias (Gomes and McCullough, 2015; 
Shanks et al., 2015; Vadillo et al., 2016). Furthermore, recent attempts to extend the study of 
countercyclical risk aversion to other samples has found limited support for priming effects: König-
                                                          
1 Further studies that successfully use priming to manipulate risk preferences include Aldrovandi et al., 2017; 
Hamilton and Biehal, 2005; Harris and Blair, 2006; Kusev et al., 2012; Ludvig et al., 2015; Mandel, 2003. For 
discussion of the literature on broader dimensions of priming see, for example, Bargh, 2006.  
2 See also Chou et al., 2007; Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013; Fehr et al., 2007; Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 
1983; Williams et al., 2003; Yuen and Lee, 2003 for further studies on the effect of emotions on risk taking.  
3 For example, see volume 32 (Issue Supplement) on “Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology” in 
Social Cognition in 2014 or studies in the social priming literature (Doyen et al., 2012; Newell and Shanks, 2014; 
Newell and Shaw, 2017; Shanks et al., 2013; 2015) reporting little convincing evidence of priming on behaviour. 
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Kersting and Trautmann (2018) do not find any evidence that the Cohn et al. (2015) priming task 
influences students; Newell and Shaw (2017) report three experiments with limited or no support for 
priming effects on students’ risk attitudes. This raises potentially interesting questions about, for 
example, whether people outside of the financial professions (including students) are largely immune 
to priming effects in this domain, or whether different sorts of priming task might be more effective at 
stimulating countercyclical risk aversion in other groups.  
In this paper, we report results from four experiments involving a total of 1939 participants and 
designed with three main objectives in mind: first, to test the reproducibility and generalisability of the 
effect of priming (negative or positive) experiences on subsequent risk taking in a population that is 
less specialised than professionals and more diverse than students; second, we test the impact of a range  
of different priming techniques; third, we test the role of fear as the underlying mechanism through 
which priming affects risk preferences. 
We conduct our experiments online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). While MTurk 
samples are not fully representative of the US population as a whole (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014), 
they offer the attraction of being able to gather large samples to underpin well-powered tests, from 
subject pools which are more diverse and more representative than the typical student subject pools 
used in many lab experiments (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013; Stewart 
et al., 2017).4  Notwithstanding these potential advantages of MTurk, however, there has been 
considerable debate about potential limitations (e.g., see discussions in Chandler et al., 2015; Hauser et 
al., 2018). While good scientific practice requires consideration of potential limitations, in our 
assessment, currently available evidence supports using evidence based on MTurk samples, alongside 
other sources.  Indeed, a variety of studies have shown that the data gathered using MTurk are reliable 
in the sense of replicating a wide range of behavioural patterns established initially through laboratory 
investigations with mainly student subject pools (e.g., Amir et al., 2012; Arechar et al., 2018; 
Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010; Rand, 2012). The relevant evidence 
includes a number of studies (e.g., D’Acunto, 2015a, 2015b; Horton et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2013; 
Preece and Stoddard, 2015; Welsh and Ordóñez, 2014) demonstrating the presence of strong priming 
effects in experiments with MTurk samples.5  
                                                          
4 For example: Casler et al., 2013 show that MTurk samples are more socio-economically and ethnically diverse 
than student samples; Buhrmester et al., 2011 show that MTurk participants come from 50 different countries. 
Compared to the average U.S. population, MTurk samples tend to be younger and better educated, but are more 
likely to have lower income and be unemployed or underemployed (Levay et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2017). 
5 Although MTurkers do self-report multitasking (e.g., Chandler et al., 2014) or engaging in distractions (e.g., 
Clifford and Jerit, 2014) while participating in experiments, they tend to show the standard decision making biases 
– such as loss aversion, present bias, risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses and as noted above, priming 
effects – with similar effect sizes to traditional samples, even though they may seem to be paying less attention to 
the experimental materials (e.g., Goodman et al., 2013). However, since all of our studies were conducted online, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed effect sizes in our studies might be lower due to less control 
over subjects’ attention compared to typical studies conducted in a lab. Further issues, which might have 
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For our investigations, in Experiment 1 and like König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018) we use 
the priming technique of Cohn et al. (2015). Subjects are asked to imagine they participate in a stock 
market crash (boom) and, after answering a series of questions regarding their investment strategy in 
such a scenario, they self-report their level of fear and general affect.  Subsequently, their willingness 
to take risk is assessed via a standard investment task (adapted by Gneezy and Potters, 1997, as in Cohn 
et al., 2015). We find no effect of priming. However, it is a feature of the results of our Experiment 1 
and those of König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018) that both failed to generate any strong emotional 
reaction among participants. As such, if indeed fear is the driving force of countercyclical risk aversion, 
it is no surprise that we fail to find such an effect. In light of these results, we conducted three further 
experiments in which we modified the priming task with the aim of inducing stronger fear responses. 
Specifically, we adapted Cohn’s et al. (2015) priming questions aiming to make them more relevant for 
our more diverse population; we also borrowed and adapted other established priming techniques from 
previous literature (e.g., Erb et al., 2002; Gilad and Kliger, 2008; MacDonald et al., 2012). 
To pre-empt our results, after running four different experiments involving over 1900 
participants (with at least 143 subjects per experimental treatment), we found no evidence that priming 
significantly influenced risk preferences. We suggest several possible interpretations. First, the original 
(treatment) effect reported in Cohn et al. (2015) could be a false positive (i.e., a Type I error). Second, 
the original effect of Cohn et al. (2015) could be an overestimate of the true effect size (see Camerer et 
al., 2018, for a discussion of inflated true positives) and, if so, our studies could be underpowered to 
detect the smaller true effect.6 Third, since we run our experiments with a subject pool different from 
the original one, our results may be indicative of a boundary condition for the effect reported in Cohn 
et al. (2015):  that is, the effect may not generalise from financial professionals to the population 
represented in MTurk.  Differences in behaviour between professionals and non-professionals have 
been widely documented in the literature (e.g., see reviews by Ball and Cech, 1996; Fréchette, 2015),7 
and it might be the case that possessing a professional investor’s identity is necessary for priming past 
experiences to be effective in stimulating countercyclical risk aversion. Crucially, however, our failure 
to find a priming effect holds independently of whether or not we successfully manipulated emotions. 
We are able to  reject the premise that, in our environment, fear drives risk averse behaviour; if anything, 
                                                          
undermined priming effects in our studies relate to concerns about non-human workers (i.e., bots) completing 
tasks in online studies (e.g., Crump et al. 2013; Mason and Suri 2012) or excessively experienced MTurk 
participants (when compared to subjects in laboratory studies) who might have been familiar with our 
experimental paradigm (e.g., Rand et al., 2014; Rand, 2018). 
6 Our studies have high statistical power to detect an effect in the same direction and of the same size as the 
original Cohn et al.’s (2015) effect. More specifically, the total sample size required to detect the effect size 
(Cohen’s d=0.421 for the risky investment task) reported by Cohn et al. (2015) with power at least 95% in a one-
sided t-test of independent groups is N=246 (and for a two-sided test is N=296). All calculations were 
implemented using software GPower 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). 
7 The evidence from the literature is mixed: some studies find that professionals are less prone to decision biases 
(e.g., Alevy et al., 2007), some find no behavioural differences (e.g., Bolton et al., 2012), whereas others suggest 
that professionals are more affected than non-professionals (e.g., Haigh and List, 2005; Gilad and Kliger, 2008). 
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  (A) Positive Experience 
our data suggest that general affect is the channel through which emotions affect risk preferences, since 
we find that in all of our experiments where general affect was significantly influenced by priming, it 
is positively correlated with risk taking: the better our participants feel, the more risk they take (in line 
with e.g., Chou et al., 2007; Nguyen and Noussair, 2014; Williams et al., 2003; Yuen and Lee, 2003). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews key features of our setup and results of 
Experiment 1. Section 3 summarizes the main aspects and findings from our three additional 
experiments aimed at successfully manipulating participants’ emotions. Section 4 presents aggregate 
results from a composite analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Experimental Design 
Experiment 1 is designed to implement the priming manipulation of Cohn et al. (2015) in an MTurk 
population.8 Subjects were asked a few introductory questions regarding investing behaviour before 
proceeding to the priming part. In the priming part, subjects were first exposed to a hypothetical stock 
market scenario. For this, subjects were shown a diagrammatic representation of a stock market history 
and its projected future (based on the one used by Cohn et al., 2015) but randomly assigned to either 
the positive or the negative treatments which differed in the direction of the market trend (Figure 1 – 
Panel A and B depict scenarios with positive and negative stock market trends, respectively). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Stock market hypothetical scenarios. 
Note: Panel A (B) was used in the positive (negative) treatment and depicts a scenario with a positive (negative) 
stock market experience. Adapted from Figure 1 in Cohn et al. (2015). 
Participants were asked to imagine that they had some investments in the stock market and they 
were experiencing a continuing market boom (or crash). They were told they expected the positive 
                                                          
8 Full instructions for Experiment 1 are reported in Appendix A. 
(B) Negative Experience 
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   (B) Ambiguity                (A) Risk 
(negative) development to continue as indicated by the arrow in Figure 1A (1B). Subjects were 
subsequently asked a series of questions about what their investment strategy would be had they 
experienced such a situation (for example, “Would you sell/buy individual stocks? Explain briefly 
why”). We used four out of the five priming questions from Cohn et al. (2015) (We removed the 
question “Would you invest in Exchange Traded Funds? Explain briefly why” on grounds that it would 
not have been meaningful for our sample of non-professional investors). After finishing the priming 
part, participants were asked to self-report their general affective state by selecting one out of nine 
manikins (Bradley and Lang, 1994) and to self-report their level of fear on a seven-point Likert scale 
(Bosman and van Winden, 2002) (see Appendix A for details). 
 Subsequently, participants made two investment decisions, one of which was randomly selected 
(after both decisions) for payment. More specifically, they were given a (notional) $200 and had to 
decide how much of it to invest in a risky asset. The amount not invested was theirs to keep. In order to 
illustrate the probabilities of the investment being successful, subjects saw a picture of a plastic box 
containing yellow, red and blue balls and were told that in the good scenario (indicated by a yellow 
ball) they would get 2.5 times the amount invested. In the bad scenario (indicated by a red or blue ball), 
they would lose their invested amount. Two variants of the investment task were used: one under risk, 
where subjects could infer the exact probability of success (50%, as per Figure 2 Panel A), and one 
under ambiguity, where subjects could not infer the exact probability of success (that was set by us 
again to 50%, Figure 2 Panel B). Subjects in the ambiguity task were asked to guess the share of yellow 
balls as a measurement of their expectations. As in Cohn et al. (2015), the ambiguity task was introduced 
before the risk task to avoid anchoring participants to the 50% probability (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974).  
 
  
Figure 2. Pictures of plastic boxes to illustrate probabilities. 
Note: Panel A (B) was used in the risk (ambiguity) variant. Adapted from Figure A2 in Cohn et al. (2015). 
7 
 
The final part of the experiment included two survey questions used by Cohn et al. (2015) to 
serve as alternative measurements of expectations (i.e., assessing participants’ general optimism 
(Scheier et al., 1994), and the likelihood of losing their job in the near future). Finally, as a second 
measurement of their market experience, subjects were asked whether they had previously participated 
in the stock market. The experiment concluded with a short questionnaire eliciting sociodemographic 
characteristics.9  
2.2 Procedures 
We conducted Experiment 1 online with subjects recruited on MTurk.  Ethics approval was obtained 
from the [Institution Name removed in accordance to double-blind review policy] Research Ethics 
Committee. A total of 294 participants completed the experiment (average age=35 years; and 53% 
male).10 They received a flat fee of $0.50 for participating, plus an additional payment ranging from $0 
to $5 depending on their choices and chance.11 Participants received instructions and made their 
decisions via web browsers and were paid via MTurk.12 After deciding to participate, subjects were 
directed to the experimental tasks on an external webpage. The tasks were coded using Qualtrics 
(http://www.qualtrics.com/). 
  
                                                          
9 We did not include the financial literacy test judging it non-suitable for our more general population sample. 
10  In Appendix C, we report randomization checks for gender, age and market experience across experiments 
(Table C4) and across treatments for a given experiment (Table C5). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that our 
variables are balanced across treatments and experiments (5% significance level) in 15 out of 18 comparisons. 
We find that the distribution of participants having invested money in the stock market is significantly different 
across experiments (ranging from 59% to 70%, chi-square p-value=0.005), that age is significantly different across 
experiments (ranging from 35.4 to 38.5 years, Kruskal-Wallis p-value=0.001) and that in E2-W2 more participants 
have invested money in the stock market in the negative compared to the positive treatment (75% vs 65%, chi-
square p-value=0.041). We control for gender, age and market experience in all of our regressions. 
11 Participants were instructed that their earnings from the investment task would be exchanged at a 1:100 rate in 
Experiment 1. In the original Cohn et al. (2015) experiment, participants received an endowment of 200 CHF and 
the payment was implemented for real for 1 every 5 participants. Our incentive scheme deviates from the original 
study, since we adjust our incentives to an MTurk population where the average pay is $1.39 per hour (see 
D’Acunto, 2015a). Although we cannot rule out that the different incentives might be a hidden moderator of the 
priming (i.e., priming effects could show up only if stakes are much higher), we think that this is unlikely. König-
Kersting and Trautmann (2018) endow their student sample in the lab with 25 euros each and similar to Cohn et 
al. (2015) implement the payment scheme for 1 out of 5 participants; they do not find any significant effect in the 
investment decisions. Furthermore, there is evidence from MTurk studies that use priming techniques in other 
contexts and successfully influence subsequent risk taking using lower incentives (e.g., D’Acunto (2015a) that 
primes male identity or D’Acunto (2015b) that manipulates exposure to anti-market rhetoric). 
12 Participants receive a completion code upon finishing the experiment, and then return to MTurk where they 
input the completion code in order to be compensated for their effort. All participants who input the completion 
code are included in the analysis. 
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2.3 Results for Experiment 1 
Figure 3 depicts the average investment shares in the two variants of the investment task.  
 
Figure 3. Average investment decisions in Experiment 1. 
Notes: The figure shows average investments in the risk task (panel A), and the ambiguity task (panel B), by 
treatments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
In the risk variant of the investment task, on average, participants invested 52% of their 
endowment in the positive treatment and 46% in the negative treatment. Although this difference is in 
the same direction as in the Cohn et al. (2015) study, it is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-
sum p-value=0.137, z=1.489). There is no statistically significant difference in the ambiguity task either, 
where subjects invest 55% and 53% (Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value=0.472, z=0.720) of their endowment 
in the positive and negative treatments respectively.  
 Following the approach of Cohn et al. (2015), we use OLS regressions to control for individual 
differences in socio-demographic characteristics and market experience. The models we estimate are:  
𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘                                                      (1) 
𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 × 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑘              (2) 
 
The dependent variable, yik, represents the percentage share of the endowment that participant 
i invested in task k. Ambiguity is a dummy for the ambiguity task and Negative is a dummy for the 
negative prime treatment. Xi contains the controls for participants’ Age, Gender, and Market 
experience.13 The results from the OLS regressions are depicted in Table 1. 
                                                          
13 In E1 we asked participants’ two questions related to their market experience. The first asks “How often, if at 
all, do you deal with investment instruments (purchase and sale)?”, and the second asks “Have you ever invested 
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 Share invested in 
the risky asset 
 
 (1) (2) 
Negative 
 
-4.855 
(3.376) 
 
-6.529 
(3.676) 
 
 
Ambiguity 4.920*** 
(1.424) 
 
3.291 
(2.083) 
 
Negative × 
Ambiguity 
 3.349 
(2.837) 
 
Age -0.225 
(0.136) 
 
-0.225 
(0.136) 
 
Male 6.277 
(3.342) 
 
6.277 
(3.345) 
 
Market Experience -0.325 
(3.691) 
-0.325 
(3.694) 
Constant 56.235*** 
(5.962) 
57.050*** 
(5.980) 
N 588 588 
Clusters 294 294 
R2 0.028 0.029 
Table 1. Regression analysis of investment decisions for Experiment 1. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. “Negative” is a dummy for the negative prime treatment 
and “Ambiguity” is a dummy for the ambiguity task. The interaction term “Negative × Ambiguity” allows the 
treatment effect to be different in the risk and ambiguity variants. “Age” is in years, and “Male” is a gender 
dummy. “Market Experience” is a dummy for individuals who report having invested money in the stock market. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05.  
 
Column (1) reveals that the coefficient for the negative prime dummy is negative, consistent 
with participants investing less in the negative compared to the positive prime treatment. However, this 
result is not statistically significant (p=0.151, t-test). When allowing for the negative prime treatment 
effect to vary across tasks (Column (2)), we find that the negative correlation between the treatment 
effect and the risk variant of the task, though increased, remains insignificant (p=0.077, t-test). 
We also test whether our treatment manipulation had any influence on expectations relative to 
the ambiguity task. Similar to Cohn et al. (2015), we use two proxies for expectations: the guessed 
probability of success in the investment task and a self-reported measure of optimism.14 Results are 
reported in Table 2 and, in line with Cohn et al. (2015) and König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018), we 
find no effect of priming on expectations. 
                                                          
money in the stock market?”. Since our subject pool is not confined to investors, departing from Cohn et al. 
(2015), we include the second question as a control variable. (In Experiments 2-4 we only asked participants this 
second question, viewing the first as less suitable for non-professionals). The treatment effects in E1 remain 
insignificant using the answers in the first question as a control variable instead (see Appendix C). 
14 Our conclusion that the priming did not influence expectations also holds if we use the degree of agreement 
with the statement “It is unlikely that I will lose my job in the next six months” as an alternative measure. 
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 Guessed 
probability 
of success 
General 
optimism 
 (1) (2) 
Negative 
 
1.626 
(1.624) 
 
0.231 
(0.181) 
 
 
Age 0.082 
(0.073) 
 
0.020*** 
(0.008) 
 
Male -3.619** 
(1.631) 
 
0.238 
(0.178) 
 
Market Experience 0.473 
(1.834) 
0.680*** 
(0.210) 
Constant 48.046*** 
(2.887) 
2.521*** 
(0.342) 
N 294 294 
R2 0.026 0.086 
Table 2. Regression analysis of expectations in Experiment 1. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variables are:  
in Column 1, the percentage of winning balls in the ambiguity task and in Column 2, the degree of agreement with 
the statement “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. The remaining variables are as 
defined above in the Table 1 notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
 
 In Cohn et al. (2015), the key identified channel affecting risk taking is emotions and, more 
specifically, Fear. We now focus on emotions to see how they were affected by our priming 
manipulation. The results are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Priming and emotions (Experiment 1) 
Note: This figure presents averages in subjects’ general affect (panel A) and fear (panel B) in the positive and 
negative priming treatments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
As we can observe in Figure 4, subjects report that they feel generally less good on average 
after a negative experience, although not significantly so (Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value=0.181, z=1.337). 
The average level of fear is slightly lower after a negative experience, but far from reaching significance 
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(Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value=0.540, z=0.613). Table 3 reports the results from OLS regressions 
investigating relationships between risk taking, priming and reported emotions.15 
 General 
affect  
(1) 
Fear 
 
(2) 
     Share invested in risky asset 
 
(3)                     (4)                   (5)                 (6) 
Negative 
 
-0.262 
(0.180) 
-0.089 
(0.139)   
-4.570 
(3.373) 
 
-4.960 
(3.371) 
 
Ambiguity   4.920*** 
(1.424) 
 
4.920*** 
(1.424) 
 
4.920*** 
(1.425) 
 
4.920*** 
(1.425) 
 
General 
affect 
  1.214 
(1.076) 
 
 
 
1.088 
(1.082) 
 
 
Fear   
 
-1.098 
(1.442) 
 
 
-1.177 
(1.456) 
 
Age 0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.206 
(0.136) 
 
-0.219 
(0.138) 
 
-0.226 
(0.135) 
 
-0.241 
(0.136) 
 
Male -0.056 
(0.182) 
-0.285** 
(0.144) 
6.243 
(3.349) 
 
5.852 
(3.388) 
 
6.338 
(3.334) 
 
5.942 
(3.373) 
 
Market 
Experience 
0.829*** 
(0.213) 
-0.071 
(0.158) 
-1.308 
(3.736) 
 
-0.378 
(3.668) 
 
-1.227 
(3.741) 
 
-0.408 
(3.674) 
 
Constant 0.871*** 
(0.313) 
1.448*** 
(0.267) 
52.306*** 
(5.640) 
 
54.690*** 
(5.851) 
 
55.288*** 
(5.996) 
 
57.941*** 
(6.157) 
 
N 294 294 588 588 588 588 
Clusters   294 294 294 294 
R2 0.068 0.034 0.026 0.024 0.031 0.030 
Table 3. Regression analysis of emotions (Experiment 1).  
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors for Columns 1 and 2, clustered at the individual 
level for Columns 3-6). The dependent variables are:  in Column 1 the level of general affect (from -4: negative 
to 4: positive), in Column 2 the level of fear (from 0: no fear to 6: high levels of fear), in columns 3-6 the share 
invested as a percentage of the endowment. The remaining variables are as defined above in the Table 1 notes. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
 
From Table 3, it can be seen that we find no effect of positive or negative priming on either the 
level of reported general affect (see model (1)) or the reported level of fear (see model (2)). In models 
(3) to (6) the dependent variable is the level of risk taking. Across these models, we find no significant 
effect of priming and no significant effect of either emotion. Hence, the null effects reported by König-
Kersting and Trautmann (2018) appear to extend to a more diverse population than students. One 
possible, perhaps plausible, interpretation of these results is that we find no treatment effect of the prime 
on risk taking behaviour because it has failed to trigger the fear response which Cohn et al. (2015) 
identify as the channel through which negative priming reduces risk taking. To test this interpretation, 
in Section 3, we present a set of further experiments which use modified priming tasks adjusted in the 
hope of generating a significant shift in fear responses in an MTurk population. 
                                                          
15 Following Cohn et al.’s (2015) and König-Kersting and Trautmann’s (2018) analyses, we test the effect of fear 
and general affect separately. Our results do not change if we control for them simultaneously (see Appendix C).  
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3. Experiments 2-4 
3.1 Design 
In this section, we report a series of new experiments conducted using broadly the same procedures as 
Experiment 1 but with adjustments designed to shed light on two key issues. The first is whether we 
could design adjusted priming tasks – for positive and negative experiences of risk – that would impact 
emotional responses of an MTurk population and, in particular, those for fear. The second issue is 
whether our adjusted priming tasks impact risk taking behaviour and if so, whether variation in risk 
taking is associated with emotional reports (especially fear). 
We report three new experiments which we label E2, E3 and E4. Details of key features of 
these experiments are provided in Table 4. Note that we collected two waves of data for Experiment 2 
(labelled E2-W1 and E2-W2 below).16 The main differences across experiments E2-E4 relate to the 
ways in which we implemented priming. The key guiding objective was to vary aspects of the priming 
tasks with a view to influencing emotional responses. Conditional on successfully manipulating 
emotions with one or more of the priming tasks, we could thereby test whether subsequent risk taking 
would be impacted by them. We summarise key features of the priming tasks for each experiment in 
the second column of Table 4, and comment further on these manipulations here. 
Consider first Experiment E2, the details of which are summarised at the top of Table 4. In E2, 
we continued to base the priming task on the hypothetical stock market scenario used in Cohn et al. 
(2015), König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018) and in our Experiment 1. The key change was the use 
of questions designed to be more meaningful for individuals who did not have significant investment 
experience. The text in the ‘priming’ column of Table 4 for Experiment E2 illustrates an example of an 
additional question, where subjects were asked to consider how variation in stock performance might 
affect them personally (instead of considering whether they would purchase real estate).17 We 
conjectured that such questions might render consideration of hypothetical stock market performance 
(via the positive or negative graphs) more relevant to our subjects, given the typical personal experience 
of our subject pool. 
For Experiments E3 and E4, we moved away from the style of priming task used in Experiment 
1 and instead adopted different styles of priming task, adapting established approaches used elsewhere 
in the priming literature (e.g., Erb et al., 2002; Gilad and Kliger, 2008; MacDonald et al., 2012), with a 
view to creating positive and negative associations with risk. The rationale behind moving away from 
a hypothetical stock market scenario was that priming via such a task might not be adequate to produce 
                                                          
16 The reason is that in the first wave we found that participants increased their risk taking after been exposed to 
the negative prime when controlling for the level of general affect (see Table 8). To test the robustness of this 
effect, we decided to replicate E2. 
17 Full instructions of Experiments 2-4 are reported in Appendix B. 
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a strong emotional response among a population who have not, typically, participated frequently in a 
stock market. With this in mind, we followed two alternative routes. In Experiment E3, we asked 
participants to describe a risk-related situation from their own past using either the positive or negative 
variant of the instruction presented in the middle row of Table 4.18 Our conjecture was that asking 
participants to draw on personal experience might be more effective at generating an emotional response 
associated with risk, than the prime used in Experiment 1 which might not be related sufficiently well 
to our typical participant’s own experience. For Experiment E4, participants were presented with 
vignettes associating risk with either prudence and loss for the negative prime or excitement and gain 
for the positive prime (see bottom row of Table 4).  Subsequently, participants were asked to read their 
vignette and memorise as many adjectives as they could, knowing that they would be asked to recall 
them afterwards.  Existing research suggests that such tasks can be effective priming techniques and 
that requiring memorisation may prolong the duration of priming effects (see for example Erb et al., 
2002; Henson and Rugg, 2003; MacDonald et al., 2012). 
We kept the investment task constant across all our experiments; besides allowing us to 
compare behaviour across all experiments, the task has the attraction of capturing whether any change 
in risk behaviour is taking place through the channel of preferences or expectations.19 It also allows us 
to combine both risk and uncertainty measurements, which may be important as uncertainty is often a 
salient characteristic of real financial situations.20 
  
                                                          
18 Similar techniques have been used for example by Callen et al. (2014) and Lerner et al. (2003). 
19 Similar to Cohn et al. (2015), König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018) and E1, subjects in the ambiguity task 
were asked to guess the share of yellow balls. This allows us to test whether changes in risk taking are driven by 
changes in risk preferences or changes in beliefs (i.e., the priming manipulation might have affected subjects’ 
assessments of the likelihoods of the good or bad states).  
20 In E3-E4, we refer to the “risky asset” as “risky account” and to the “investment decisions” as “decisions”, 
since our priming is not related to the stock market. 
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Experiment Priming technique  N Male Age Payment 
Experiment 2 
(E2) 
Wave 
1 
(W1) 
Similar to Experiment 1, but with more 
questions that were adjusted to non-
professional investors. For example, we 
substituted the question “Would you consider 
purchasing real estate (for instance a house)? 
Explain briefly why.” with the question 
“Please list the different ways in which your 
life would be affected by the stock market 
crash (boom).” 
391 51% 37 
Flat fee of 
$0.50 plus 
bonus ($0-
$5) 
Wave 
2 
(W2) 
402 49% 39 
Flat fee of 
$0.50 plus 
bonus ($0-
$5) 
Experiment 3 (E3) 
Answer the question “Describe a negative 
(positive) experience you had involving 
losing (winning) money. This could be 
anything, for example losing (winning) 
money from investing, from gambling, from a 
lottery ticket or from any other situation that 
resulted in a financial loss (gain) for you”. 
451 48% 36 
Flat fee of 
$0.50 plus 
bonus ($0-
$1) 
Experiment 4 (E4) 
“Read a story and memorize as many 
adjectives as possible”. The adjectives are 
taken from a story describing either a positive 
or negative experience such as to advocate 
risk averse and risk seeking behaviour (e.g., 
responsible versus adventurous, loss versus 
gain). 
401 45% 37 
Flat fee of 
$0.50 plus 
bonus ($0-
$5) 
Table 4. Details of Experiments 2-4.21 
Note: In E2-W1, we elicited subjects’ socio-demographics at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
3.2 Results for Experiments 2-4  
We first examine whether our priming manipulations were successful in triggering emotions. The 
average levels of general affect and fear are depicted in Figure 5. We organize the results such that each 
row of the figure corresponds to the same emotion and each column corresponds to the same 
experiment. Eyeballing Figure 5, we can see that emotions were successfully altered in the same 
direction as in Cohn et al. (2015) for 3 out of 4 experiments (all Wilcoxon rank-sum p-values<0.001 
for E2-W1, E2-W2 and E3). A negative prime leads to participants reporting lower levels of general 
affect and higher levels of fear. These results are confirmed by OLS regressions, reported in Table 5, 
where we observe that, with the exception of Experiment 4, negative primes are associated with highly 
significant increases in fear and reductions in general affect.  
                                                          
21 In some of our experiments, we included further treatments that examine different research questions, i.e., they 
either involve no priming or they examine whether the degree of social connectedness to an experience affects 
risk taking. Experiment E2-W1 was conducted in three sessions for the negative treatment and in one session for 
the positive treatment. Experiments E1, E2-W2, E3 and E4 were respectively conducted in one session. 
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Figure 5. Priming and emotions (Experiments 2-4). 
Notes: This figure presents averages in subjects’ general affect (ranging from “-4=negative” to “4=positive” – 
panel A) and fear (ranging from “0=no fear to 6=high fear” – panel B) in the positive and negative priming 
treatments for all new experiments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
  
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.096 
p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.665 
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
 General 
affect (1) 
Fear 
(2) 
   General              Fear 
  affect (1)             (2) 
General 
affect (1) 
Fear 
(2) 
General 
affect (1) 
Fear 
(2) 
Negative 
 
-1.638*** 
(0.176) 
 
0.769*** 
(0.162) 
-1.065*** 
(0.170) 
 
0.489*** 
(0.147) 
 
-2.311*** 
(0.158) 
0.722*** 
(0.120) 
0.256 
(0.169) 
 
-0.023 
(0.118) 
 
Age 
 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
0.016 
(0.008) 
 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
 
0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Male -0.074 
(0.176) 
-0.176 
(0.164) 
-0.053 
(0.184) 
 
-0.249 
(0.150) 
 
0.213 
(0.163) 
-0.224 
(0.124) 
-0.276 
(0.177) 
-0.060 
(0.123) 
Market 
Experience 
0.093 
(0.189) 
-0.334 
(0.186) 
0.570*** 
(0.204) 
 
-0.099 
(0.165) 
 
0.271 
(0.169) 
0.107 
(0.127) 
0.267 
(0.189) 
-0.148 
(0.130) 
Constant 0.652** 
(0.327) 
1.755*** 
(0.312) 
0.433 
(0.329) 
1.383*** 
(0.270) 
1.187*** 
(0.310) 
0.792*** 
(0.215) 
0.504 
(0.299) 
0.760*** 
(0.224) 
N 391 391 40022 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.197 0.078 0.118 0.037 0.337 0.084 0.032 0.006 
Table 5. Regression analysis of emotions. 
Note: We report OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors). The dependent variable is the level of general 
affect (1) or the level of fear (2). The remaining variables are as defined above in the Table 1 notes. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05.  
 
We now examine risk taking behaviour. Since we have identified significant shifts of emotions, 
including fear, attributable to the priming manipulations employed in experiments E2 and E3, then to 
the extent that fear is a key factor explaining risk taking in this type of task, we have a basis for 
predicting corresponding shifts in risk taking in these two experiments. 
Our results from the investment decisions are depicted in Figure 6. Similarly to Figure 5, each 
column refers to a given experiment: the top row shows responses to the risk task for each experiment 
while the bottom row shows responses to the ambiguity task, by experiment. 
                                                          
22 We exclude two participants from the regression analysis of E2-W2 for not reporting properly whether they 
have any market experience. 
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Figure 6. Average investment decisions (Experiments 2-4). 
Notes: The figure shows average investments in the risk task (panel A), and the ambiguity task (panel B), by 
treatments for all new experiments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, average investment decisions are not significantly different across 
positive and negative treatments in any of the 8 comparisons (all Wilcoxon rank-sum p-values>0.175). 
We reach the same conclusion from OLS regressions reported in Table 6. We find either positive or 
negative effects of the negative prime on subsequent risk taking, but the effects are never statistically 
significant at the 5% level when we control for individual characteristics. 
  
p=0.597 p=0.175 p=0.194 p=0.381 
p=0.821 p=0.844 p=0.754 p=0.912 
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
 Share invested in the risky asset 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Negative 
2.535 
(2.775) 
 
3.490 
(3.015) 
 
-0.150 
(2.805) 
 
0.956 
(3.117) 
 
-3.064 
(2.469) 
 
-4.349 
(2.789) 
 
-1.787 
(2.685) 
 
-3.301 
(2.953) 
 
Ambiguity 
2.029 
(1.359) 
 
2.977 
(1.759) 
 
2.020 
(1.216) 
 
3.087 
(1.780) 
 
-0.187 
(1.187) 
 
-1.492 
(1.832) 
 
-1.751 
(1.205) 
 
-3.276 
(1.847) 
 
Negative × 
Ambiguity 
 
 
-1.910 
(2.721) 
 
 
-2.211 
(2.422) 
 
 
2.571 
(2.379) 
 
 
3.028 
(2.409) 
 
Age 
 
-0.063 
(0.138) 
 
-0.063 
(0.138) 
 
-0.073 
(0.132) 
 
-0.073 
(0.132) 
 
-0.195 
(0.119) 
 
-0.195 
(0.119) 
 
-0.149 
(0.119) 
 
-0.149 
(0.119) 
 
Male 
 
2.307 
(2.833) 
 
2.307 
(2.835) 
 
5.883** 
(2.970) 
 
5.883** 
(2.972) 
 
12.949*** 
(2.531) 
 
12.949*** 
(2.533) 
 
5.978** 
(2.950) 
 
5.978** 
(2.952) 
 
Market 
Experience 
 
2.816 
(3.094) 
 
2.816 
(3.096) 
 
2.399 
(3.322) 
 
2.399 
(3.324) 
 
3.470 
(2.590) 
 
3.470 
(2.592) 
 
-1.982 
(2.987) 
 
-1.982 
(2.989) 
 
Constant 
46.019*** 
(5.491) 
45.545*** 
(5.550) 
47.341*** 
(5.981) 
46.807*** 
(6.034) 
43.352*** 
(4.871) 
44.005*** 
(4.933) 
49.154*** 
(5.074) 
49.916*** 
(5.117) 
N 782 782 800 800 902 902 802 802 
Clusters 391 391 400 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.064 0.064 0.017 0.018 
Table 6. Regression analysis of investment decisions. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. The remaining variables are as defined above in the Table 
1 notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
 
Did the priming manipulation have any effect on participants’ expectations? The results from 
our analysis of the priming manipulations on the guessed share of winning balls and the self-reported 
level of optimism are reported in Table 7. While we find that older participants and participants who 
have some market experience are more optimistic, we do not find any evidence that participants’ 
expectations are influenced by priming. This finding is in line with results from our Experiment 1, Cohn 
et al. (2015) and König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018). 
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
 Guessed 
probability 
of success 
(1) 
General 
optimism 
(2) 
Guessed 
probability 
of success      
(1) 
General 
optimism 
      (2) 
Guessed 
probability 
of success 
(1) 
General 
optimism 
(2) 
Guessed 
probability 
of success 
(1) 
General 
optimism 
(2) 
Negative 
 
0.991 
(1.514) 
 
0.216 
(0.155) 
-0.767 
(1.491) 
 
0.240 
(0.152) 
 
1.310 
(1.522) 
-0.192 
(0.138) 
2.889 
(1.597) 
 
0.195 
(0.153) 
 
Age 
 
0.038 
(0.071) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.061 
(0.062) 
 
0.014** 
 (0.006) 
 
0.046 
(0.072) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.020 
(0.065) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
Male -1.693 
(1.515) 
-0.014 
(0.157) 
-3.085** 
(1.478) 
 
0.003 
 (0.154) 
 
-0.623 
(1.536) 
0.150 
(0.143) 
1.222 
(1.643) 
-0.061 
(0.160) 
Market 
Experience 
-0.520 
(1.705) 
0.520*** 
(0.183) 
1.276 
(1.596) 
 
0.431** 
(0.181) 
 
0.212 
(1.668) 
0.401*** 
(0.151) 
0.194 
(1.743) 
0.334 
(0.174) 
Constant 47.777*** 
(2.746) 
2.460*** 
(0.279) 
51.941*** 
(2.841) 
2.986*** 
(0.297) 
43.337*** 
(2.859) 
3.295*** 
(0.253) 
44.387*** 
(2.805) 
2.880*** 
(0.268) 
N 391 391 400 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.041 0.003 0.041 0.009 0.048 
Table 7. Regression analysis of expectations. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors). The dependent variables are:  in Column 1 
the percentage of winning balls in the ambiguity task, in Column 2 the degree of agreement to the statement 
“Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. The remaining variables are as defined above in 
the Table 1 notes.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
 
Similar to our previous analysis, we assess the effect of emotions on investment behaviour 
using OLS regression. Our results are depicted in Table 8 for models including fear and in Table 9 for 
models using general affect. Eyeballing the results in Tables 8 and 9, we find no evidence of fear having 
any explanatory power on the investment decisions.  On the contrary, our results for E2-W1, E2-W2 
and E3 where emotions were significantly different between treatments reveal that, if anything, general 
affect is the channel through which emotions affect risk taking: specifically, the better participants feel, 
the more they invest (in line with e.g., Chou et al., 2007; Nguyen and Noussair, 2014; Williams et al., 
2003; Yuen and Lee, 2003). 
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
                                   Share invested in the risky asset   
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Negative 
  
2.433 
(2.831) 
 
 
0.205 
(2.813) 
 
 
-2.606 
(2.580) 
 
 -1.762 
(2.683) 
Ambiguity 2.029 
(1.359) 
2.029 
(1.360) 
2.020 
(1.216) 
2.020 
(1.217) 
-0.187 
(1.187) 
-0.187 
(1.188) 
-1.751 
(1.205) 
-1.751 
(1.206) 
         
Fear 0.308 
(0.954) 
 
0.133 
(0.972) 
 
-0.713 
(0.942) 
 
-0.725 
(0.945) 
 
      -0.904 
     (0.979) 
 
-0.634 
(1.022) 
 
1.111 
(1.188) 
 
1.104 
(1.181) 
 
Age -0.054 
(0.140) 
 
-0.061 
(0.138) 
 
-0.077 
(0.131) 
 
-0.077 
(0.132) 
 
-0.201 
(0.118) 
 
-0.200 
(0.119) 
 
-0.144 
(0.117) 
-0.148 
(0.117) 
Male 2.388 
(2.847) 
 
2.330 
(2.842) 
 
5.704 
(2.957) 
 
5.702 
(2.958) 
 
12.706*** 
(2.532) 
 
12.807*** 
(2.536) 
 
6.208** 
(2.968) 
 
6.045** 
(2.949) 
 
Market 
Experience 
2.803 
(3.092) 
2.860 
(3.087) 
2.351 
(3.334) 
2.327 
(3.347) 
3.657 
(2.585) 
3.538 
(2.584) 
  -1.841 
  (2.989) 
  -1.818 
  (2.992) 
Constant 46.482*** 
(5.503) 
 
45.786*** 
(5.672) 
 
48.421*** 
(5.783) 
 
48.343*** 
(6.022) 
 
42.767*** 
(4.827) 
43.855*** 
(4.940) 
47.198*** 
(4.995) 
48.315*** 
(5.170) 
N 782 782 800 800 902 902 802 802 
Clusters 391 391 400 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.063 0.064 0.018 0.019 
Table 8. Regression analysis of investment decisions on fear. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. Fear is the self-reported measurement of fear (from 0: no 
fear to 6: high levels of fear). The remaining variables are as defined above in the Table 1 notes. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05.  
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
                                Share invested in the risky asset   
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Negative 
  
7.050** 
(3.151) 
 
 
2.134 
(2.985) 
 
 
-0.061 
(2.877) 
 
 -1.910 
(2.678) 
Ambiguity 2.029 
(1.359) 
 
2.029 
(1.360) 
 
2.020 
(1.216) 
 
2.020 
(1.217) 
 
-0.187 
(1.187) 
 
-0.187 
(1.188) 
 
-1.751 
(1.205) 
-1.751 
(1.206) 
General 
affect 
1.961*** 
(0.746) 
2.756*** 
(0.856) 
1.963** 
(0.828) 
2.143** 
(0.884) 
1.308** 
(0.599) 
1.300 
(0.700) 
0.440 
(0.838) 
0.481 
(0.833) 
         
Age -0.091 
(0.140) 
 
-0.122 
(0.138) 
 
-0.107 
(0.130) 
 
-0.106 
(0.130) 
 
-0.211 
(0.118) 
 
-0.211 
(0.118) 
 
-0.152 
(0.121) 
-0.157 
(0.121) 
Male 2.519 
(2.817) 
 
2.511 
(2.788) 
 
5.979** 
(2.943) 
 
5.996** 
(2.938) 
 
12.670*** 
(2.529) 
 
12.672*** 
(2.542) 
 
6.275** 
(2.959) 
 
6.111** 
(2.942) 
Market 
Experience 
2.346 
(3.040) 
2.561 
(3.011) 
1.509 
(3.326) 
1.178 
(3.359) 
3.117 
(2.592) 
3.118 
(2.594) 
-2.125 
(2.986) 
-2.110 
(2.987) 
Constant 47.249*** 
(5.176) 
 
44.221*** 
(5.423) 
 
47.400*** 
(5.572) 
 
46.412*** 
(5.813) 
 
41.777*** 
(4.667) 
41.809*** 
(4.825) 
47.733*
** 
(4.885) 
48.911*** 
(5.072) 
N 782 782 800 800 902 902 802 802 
Clusters 391 391 400 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.020 0.030 0.027 0.028 0.069 0.069 0.017 0.018 
Table 9. Regression analysis of investment decisions on general affect. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. General affect is the self-reported measurement of affect 
(from -4: negative to 4: positive). The remaining variables are as defined above in the Table 1 notes. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05.  
 
4. Composite analysis 
The disadvantage of looking for an effect separately in each experiment is that it does not provide 
cumulative evidence for the underlying effect, and to overcome this, several studies have argued for 
assessing replication using meta-analytic estimates (e.g., Braver et al., 2014; Camerer et al., 2018; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015; Stanley and Spence, 2014).23 We follow this approach as a final step in 
order to estimate a current best guess of the overall effect size due to priming in the risk and ambiguity 
tasks combining evidence from our experiments with effect sizes reported in the original Cohn et al. 
study (2015), and in the study by König-Kersting and Trautmann (2018).24 We use standard random 
effects25 meta-analysis procedures to determine average effect sizes using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988): 
the mean difference in risk taking between the positive and negative treatments, divided by the pooled 
                                                          
23 In Appendix D, we report a series of alternative analyses to estimate the underlying effect such as confidence 
intervals, prediction intervals and Bayesian tests. Results are broadly in line with what we report in the main text. 
24 Since most of the studies included in the composite analysis are generated from the same group of researchers, 
we do not consider this exercise as a sufficient condition to obtain a definitive estimate of the underlying effect 
size; however, we believe it is a useful step in the right direction.  
25 A random effects model is more suitable for our purposes than the fixed effects alternative that assumes effect 
sizes only differ by sampling error. Our conclusions do not change if we consider a fixed effects model instead.  
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standard deviation. The results from our composite analysis are depicted in Figure 7 for the risk (Panel 
A) and ambiguity (Panel B) tasks.  
 
Figure 7. Composite analysis for the risk (A) and ambiguity (B) variants of the task. 
Notes: Effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals are shown per experiment. A positive effect size indicates that 
the mean risk taking was higher in the positive compared to the negative treatment. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7, the overall effect size is 0.08 95% CI [-0.03, 0.20] in the risk task 
and 0.03 95% CI [-0.05, 0.12] in the ambiguity task. The direction of the effect is positive in both cases, 
consistent with primes of negative experiences reducing risk taking; however, the overall effect is not 
statistically distinguishable from zero for either variant of the task. 
5. Conclusions 
Using a range of priming techniques from psychology and economics, we found that priming has no 
significant overall effect on risk preferences in an MTurk population. Crucially, this result holds 
independently of whether we were able to successfully manipulate the level of emotions. Furthermore, 
while we do find some relationship between emotional responses and risk taking, we reject the premise 
that, in our environment, increased fear is associated with lower levels of risk taking; instead, our results 
speak in favour of an influence of general affect, of the form that: the better you feel, the more risk you 
take. 
Our experiments were inspired partly by the findings of Cohn et al. (2015) who reported a 
significant impact of priming ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ scenarios on risk taking in a sample of professional 
investors. While our experiments include priming techniques very close to those of Cohn et al. (2015) 
(Experiment 1) and use the same procedures for measuring risk taking, our experimental designs depart 
importantly from theirs by using a different subject pool (i.e., MTurk).  Because of this we do not 
interpret our results as a failure to replicate their original findings.  Rather, our results lead us to question 
the generalisability of the priming effects observed by Cohn et al. (2015) from financial professionals 
to a more diverse (and less specialist) MTurk population. As well as suggesting this boundary, however, 
our findings add to the evidence highlighting the context sensitivity of priming effects and to the 
evidence concerning the emotional underpinnings of risk taking.  
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Appendix A 
Appendix A reports the instructions from Experiment 1 (Priming questions, Emotions and Investment 
task) 
Priming  
In this study you will be requested to answer several questions regarding the following scenario.  
Imagine you find yourself in a continuing stock market boom (crash). You expect the positive 
(negative) development to continue as indicated by the arrow in the graph.  
 
Note: Panel A (B) was used in the positive (negative) treatment. Adapted from Figure 1 in Cohn et al. (2015). 
 
1. Would you sell/buy individual stocks? Explain briefly why. 
2. Would you invest in gold or other precious metals? Explain briefly why. 
3. Would you deposit part of your assets on your savings account? Explain briefly why. 
4. Would you consider purchasing real estate (for instance a house)? Explain briefly why. 
Emotions 
1. How are you feeling at the moment? Please select one of the numbers to indicate how you feel
 
2. To what extent are you experiencing the emotion "fear" at the moment? 
1-Not at all             2              3              4              5             6            7-A lot 
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Investment task 
We now proceed to the bonus part. In this part you will make two investment decisions; by doing so 
you will win or lose money. Note that only one of the two investment decisions will be paid out at the 
end of the study. The decision that will be paid out is determined randomly. 
  
First Investment Decision 
Your initial endowment amounts to $200. You have to decide what share of this you would like to 
invest in a risky asset. You can keep the remaining amount that you do not invest. 
The investment decision works like this 
We will randomly -without looking into the box- draw one of the balls out of the big plastic box (see 
picture). The big plastic box contains red, blue and yellow balls in an unknown ratio. If a yellow ball is 
drawn, you win and receive 2.5 times the amount you invested. If a red or a blue ball is drawn, you 
will lose your investment and you will not get anything back. 
  
 
 
  Your earnings are thus calculated as follows 
• If you win (yellow ball is drawn): 
Your earnings = $200 minus investment plus (2.5 x investment) 
• If you lose (a red or blue ball is drawn): 
Your earnings = $200 minus investment 
  
How many $ would you like to invest (0 - 200)? 
What is your guess of the share of yellow (winning) balls in the big plastic box? (In percent 0-100) 
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Second investment decision 
  
Your initial endowment amounts again to $200. You may now decide what share of this you would like 
to invest in a risky asset. You may keep the remaining amount that you do not invest. 
  
The investment decision works like this 
  
Again we will randomly -without looking into the box- draw one of the balls out of the small plastic 
box (see picture). The small plastic box contains one red and one yellow ball. If the yellow ball is 
drawn, you win and receive 2.5 times the amount you have invested. If the red ball is drawn, you 
will lose your investment and you will not get anything back. 
 
 
  
Your earnings are thus calculated as follows 
• If you win (yellow ball is drawn) 
Your earnings = $200 minus investment plus (2.5 x investment) 
• If you lose (a red or blue ball is drawn) 
Your earnings = $200 minus investment  
 
How many $ would you like to invest (0 - 200)?  
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Appendix B 
Appendix B reports the priming techniques used in Experiments 2-4  
Experiment 2 
In this study you will be requested to answer several questions regarding the following scenario.  
Imagine you find yourself in a continuing stock market boom (crash). You expect the positive 
(negative) development to continue as indicated by the arrow in the graph.  
 
Note: Panel A (B) was used in the positive (negative) treatment. Adapted from Figure 1 in Cohn et al. (2015). 
 
1. Do you think that you would sell individual stocks? Explain briefly why. 
2. Would you expect that you would transfer part of your investments in a savings account 
instead? Explain briefly why. 
3. How risky do you consider it is for you to continue investing in the stock market? Explain 
briefly why. 
4. How would you expect you would feel? Explain briefly. 
5. How disappointed do you expect you would feel? 
How unhappy do you expect you would feel? 
How stressed do you expect you would feel? 
How pessimistic do you expect you would feel? 
How worried do you expect you would feel? 
1-Not at all             2              3              4              5             6            7-A lot 
6. Do you think it is likely that you would invest again in the stock market in the future? Explain 
briefly why/why not. 
7. Please list the different ways in which your life would be affected by the stock market boom 
(crash).  
8. Please write down your feelings about this experience of a stock market boom (crash) 
happening to you. 
 
Experiment 3  
Positive priming: In this study we would first like you to spend a few minutes describing a positive 
experience you had involving winning money. This could be anything, for example winning money 
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from investing, from gambling, from a lottery ticket or from any other situation that resulted in a 
financial gain for you. 
Negative priming: In this study we would first like you to spend a few minutes describing a negative 
experience you had involving losing money. This could be anything, for example losing money from 
investing, from gambling, from a lottery ticket or from any other situation that resulted in a financial 
loss for you. 
 
Experiment 4  
Negative priming: (vignette in which risk taking is associated with imprudence and loss) 
 Risk averse: “Danny is a responsible, reasonable, and reliable person, who is trustworthy and level-
headed. In his last journey, he has chosen to go to a Greek island. In the first evening, he decided to join 
a guided tour provided by his hotel for the visitors. During the tour, the visitors arrived at a casino. 
While the other visitors decided to bet at the casino, Danny decided to avoid betting, and go sight-seeing 
instead. When he reunited with the visitors who went to the casino he found out that they lost a lot of 
money, and will therefore have to end their vacation sooner than they had planned to. Danny was 
satisfied with his reasonable decision not to go to the casino, his prudence made the rest of his joyful 
stay at the island possible, in contrast to the rest of the group.” 
Please proceed to the memorization task when ready, where you will be asked to recollect as 
many adjectives as you can from the story you just read. 
 
Positive priming: (vignette in which risk taking is associated with adventure and winning) 
Risk seeking: “Danny is an adventurous, courageous, and initiatory person, who is fond of new 
experiences, likes thrills and does not hesitate to take risks. In his last journey he went to Turkey and, 
one evening, he decided to go betting at a casino. He entered the casino with $4,000 and, as suitable for 
a daring person, decided to play the roulette, a game with a high risk factor. He was lucky that day, and 
collected $30,000. Danny left the casino satisfied by the initiative he has taken. He decided to celebrate 
with a fancy dinner at the hotel’s bar, and afterwards went up to his room happy and satisfied.” 
 
Please proceed to the memorization task when ready, where you will be asked to recollect as 
many adjectives as you can from the story you just read.  
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Appendix C 
Appendix C reports further regression tables. Table C1 reports regression results from Experiment 1, 
when using Investment Instrument Frequency as a control variable. Tables C2 and C3 report regression 
analysis including both emotions simultaneously. Table C2 corresponds to Table 3 and Table C3 to 
Tables 8 and 9.   
 Share invested in the risky asset 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Negative 
 
-4.623 
(3.365) 
-6.298 
(3.661) 
-4.816 
(3.360) 
 
-6.490 
(3.664) 
 
 
Ambiguity 4.920*** 
(1.424) 
3.291 
(2.083) 
4.920*** 
(1.424) 
 
3.291 
(2.083) 
 
Negative × 
Ambiguity 
 3.349 
(2.837) 
 3.349 
(2.837) 
 
Age -0.243 
(0.133) 
-0.243 
(0.133) 
-0.218 
(0.131) 
 
-0.218 
(0.131) 
 
Male 6.086 
(3.342) 
6.086 
(3.345) 
5.214 
(3.375) 
 
5.214 
(3.378) 
 
Investment 
Instruments 
4.069 
(3.675) 
4.069 
(3.678) 
7.620 
(4.372) 
7.620 
(4.376) 
Constant 53.799*** 
(6.109) 
54.613*** 
(6.123) 
55.038*** 
(5.827) 
55.853*** 
(5.844) 
N 588 588 588 588 
Clusters 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.031 0.032 0.036 0.036 
Table C1. Regression analysis of investment decisions. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. “Negative” is a dummy for the negative prime treatment 
and “Ambiguity” is a dummy for the ambiguity task. The interaction term “Negative × Ambiguity” allows the 
treatment effect to be different in the risk and ambiguity variants. “Age” is the individual’s age in years, and 
“Male” is a gender dummy. “Investment Instruments” in Columns (1) and (2) is a dummy for individuals who 
answer at least “Once per year” in the question “How often, if at all, do you deal with investment instruments 
(purchase and sale)?”, whereas in Columns (3) and (4) they answer at least “Once a month” (Answers range from 
“Never” to “Daily”). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
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 General 
affect  
(1) 
Fear 
 
(2) 
Share invested in risky 
asset 
(3)                 (4) 
Negative 
 
-0.262 
(0.180) 
-0.089 
(0.139)  
-4.694 
(3.369) 
 
Ambiguity   4.920*** 
(1.425) 
 
4.920*** 
(1.427) 
 
General 
affect 
  1.051 
(1.202) 
 
0.883 
(1.209) 
 
Fear   -0.634 
(1.615) 
 
-0.783 
(1.628) 
 
Age 0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.214 
(0.137) 
 
-0.236 
(0.136) 
 
Male -0.056 
(0.182) 
-0.285** 
(0.144) 
6.051 
(3.396) 
 
6.104 
(3.383) 
 
Market 
Experience 
0.829*** 
(0.213) 
-0.071 
(0.158) 
-1.217 
(3.765) 
 
-1.113 
(3.773) 
 
Constant 0.871*** 
(0.313) 
1.448*** 
(0.267) 
53.303*** 
(6.068) 
 
56.600*** 
(6.402) 
 
N 294 294 588 588 
Clusters   294 294 
R2 0.068 0.034 0.026 0.031 
Table C2. Regression analysis of emotions in Experiment 1. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors for Columns 1 and 2, clustered on individuals 
for Columns 3-4). The dependent variables are:  in Column 1 the level of general affect (from -4: negative to 4: 
positive), in Column 2 the level of fear (from 0: no fear to 6: high levels of fear), in columns 3 and 4 the share 
invested as a percentage of the endowment. The remaining variables are as defined in Table C1. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05. 
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 E2-W1 E2-W2 
 
E3 E4 
Share invested in the risky asset 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Negative 
  
6.898** 
(3.145) 
 
 
2.097 
(2.976) 
 
 
-0.020 
(2.898) 
 
 -1.963 
(2.672) 
Ambiguity 2.029 
(1.360) 
 
2.029 
(1.360) 
 
2.020 
(1.217) 
 
2.020 
(1.217) 
 
-0.187 
(1.188) 
 
-0.187 
(1.188) 
 
-1.751 
(1.206) 
-1.751 
(1.206) 
General 
affect 
2.794*** 
(0.826) 
 
3.547*** 
(0.931) 
 
2.063** 
(0.890) 
 
2.227** 
(0.944) 
 
1.265 
(0.647) 
 
1.263 
(0.728) 
 
0.777 
(0.919) 
0.822 
(0.914) 
Fear 1.938 
(1.041) 
 
1.881 
(1.019) 
 
   0.296 
   (0.987) 
 
0.258 
(0.985) 
 
   -0.175 
   (1.054) 
 
-0.174 
(1.061) 
 
1.483 
(1.272) 
1.497 
(1.263) 
Age -0.085 
(0.139) 
 
-0.115 
(0.137) 
 
-0.107 
(0.130) 
 
-0.106 
(0.130) 
 
-0.212 
(0.118) 
 
-0.212 
(0.118) 
 
-0.156 
(0.120) 
-0.161 
(0.120) 
Male 2.921 
(2.811) 
 
2.901 
(2.786) 
 
6.058** 
(2.909) 
 
6.065** 
(2.905) 
 
12.640*** 
(2.526) 
 
12.641*** 
(2.541) 
 
6.463** 
(2.957) 
 
6.295** 
(2.940) 
Market 
Experience 
2.922 
(3.023) 
3.115 
(2.989) 
1.477 
(3.313) 
1.156 
(3.349) 
3.146 
(2.579) 
3.146 
(2.581) 
  -1.996 
  (2.985) 
  -1.980 
  (2.988) 
Constant 43.248*** 
(5.541) 
 
40.403*** 
(5.782) 
 
46.930*** 
(5.644) 
 
46.019*** 
(5.896) 
 
41.981*** 
(4.830) 
41.991*** 
(4.946) 
46.403*** 
(5.018) 
47.601*** 
(5.200) 
N 782 782 800 800 902 902 802 802 
Clusters 391 391 400 400 451 451 401 401 
R2 0.027 0.038 0.027 0.029 0.069 0.069 0.020 0.021 
Table C3. Regression analysis of emotions in Experiments 2-4. 
Notes: We report OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered on individuals). The dependent variable is 
the share invested as a percentage of the endowment. “General affect” is the self-reported measurement of affect 
(from -4: negative to 4: positive) and “Fear” is the self-reported measurement of fear (from 0: no fear to 6: high 
levels of fear). The remaining variables are as defined in Table C1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
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 Age Gender  
(Male proportion) 
Market Experience 
E1 35.4 53% 67% 
E2-W1 36.5 51% 65% 
E2-W2 38.5 49% 70% 
E3 36.1 48% 60% 
E4 37.2 45% 59% 
p-values  0.001 0.275 0.005 
Table C4. Randomization check across experiments (chi-square test for binary variables gender and 
market experience, Kruskal-Wallis test for Age). 
 
 Age p-
values 
Gender 
(Male proportion) 
p-
values 
Market Experience p-
values 
 Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative  
E1 36.6 34.2 0.101 52% 55% 0.620 68% 66% 0.652 
E2-W1 36.1 37.0 0.329 51% 51% 0.957 66% 63% 0.521 
E2-W2 38.9 38.1 0.449 47% 50% 0.562 65% 75% 0.041 
E3 36.3 35.8 0.654 47% 48% 0.803 62% 58% 0.431 
E4 37.8 36.7 0.321 49% 41% 0.101 60% 58% 0.702 
Table C5. Randomization check across treatments for a given experiment (chi-square test for binary 
variables gender and market experience, ranksum test for variable age). 
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Appendix D 
Although p-values are an informative aspect of evaluating the success of a replication, it might be the 
case that many of the replication studies just fall short of the 0.05 cut-off criterion (see the discussion 
in Braver et al., 2014; Camerer et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). To this end, we report 
a series of complementary measurements to assess the replicability of our studies. 
For each experiment, we report t-tests with their accompanying p-values. We further 
complement our analysis using Bayesian methods (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014; Morey and Rouder, 
2011; Rouder et al., 2009) that have increasingly been used as an alternative approach to standard 
hypothesis testing (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; Newell and Shaw, 2017; Shanks et al., 2013, 2015). More 
specifically, for each experiment we compute a “Bayes factor”, which is the ratio of the probability of 
the data given the null hypothesis versus the probability of the data given the experimental hypothesis. 
A Bayes factor of between 1∶1 and 3∶1 is taken to provide ‘anecdotal’ evidence in favour of the null, 
whereas factors of between 3∶1 and 10∶1 provide ‘substantial’ support and factors between 10:1 and 
30:1 provide ‘strong’ support in favour of the null (Wetzels et al., 2011). We report results from both 
analyses in Tables D1 (t-tests) and D2 (Bayes factors), respectively. We find no evidence of 
countercyclical risk aversion either in the risk or the ambiguity variant of the task (all t-test p-
values>0.05, all Bayes factors>1 both for one-tailed and two-tailed tests).1 
 RISK AMBIGUITY 
 t P-value t P-value 
Study  Two-sided One-sided  Two-sided One-sided 
E1 1.552 0.122 0.061 0.671 0.503 0.251 
E2-W1 -1.100 0.272 0.864 -0.455 0.650 0.675 
E2-W2 -0.436 0.663 0.668 0.316 0.752 0.376 
E3 1.456 0.146 0.073 0.605 0.545 0.273 
E4 1.196 0.232 0.116 0.191 0.849 0.424 
Table D1. Results from t-tests. 
 RISK AMBIGUITY 
 BF01 BF01 
Study Two-sided One-sided Two-sided One-sided 
E1 2.474 1.323 6.284 4.225 
E2-W1 4.984 17.774 8.085 12.336 
E2-W2 8.255 12.341 8.621 6.931 
E3 3.431 1.857 8.013 5.532 
E4 4.534 2.577 8.885 7.737 
Table D2. Results from Bayes factors (BF01). 
                                                          
1 We used a Cauchy distribution centered on zero with a scale parameter of √2/2, i.e., Cauchy (0, 0.707) that has 
been suggested as a prior for the standardized mean difference in Bayesian t tests (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018; 
Newell and Le Pelley, 2018). We report both two-sided (H0: δ=0; H1: δ≠0) and one-sided (H0: δ=0; H+: δ>0) 
Bayes factors that take into account the direction of the effect from the original study (e.g., see Wagenmakers et 
al., 2018). Following Wagenmakers et al., 2018, since the Bayes factor favours H0, we report “BF01” instead of 
the mathematically equivalent statement “BF10” for ease of interpretation. All calculations were implemented 
using software JASP (JASP team, 2018). 
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As a next step, we calculate the original effect size of the Cohn et al. (2015) study and compare 
whether it lies within the 95% confidence interval estimated from our experiments (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). Table D3 reports effect sizes and 95% CIs across all studies using Cohen’s d 
(Cohen, 1988): the mean difference in risk taking between the positive and negative treatments, divided 
by the pooled standard deviation. Notably, all of the replication effect sizes are much smaller than the 
original study effect and all 95% CIs include zero. For the subset of our studies we find that zero out of 
the five replication CIs contains the original effect size of 0.421 in the risk variant and one out of five 
replication CIs contains the original effect of 0.275 in the ambiguity variant. 
 RISK AMBIGUITY 
Study Cohen’s d (95% CI) Cohen’s d (95%CI) 
Cohn et al. (2015) 0.421 (0.108, 0.732) 0.275 (-0.035, 0.584) 
E1 0.181 (-0.048, 0.410) 0.078 (-0.151, 0.307) 
E2-W1 -0.111 (-0.310, 0.087) -0.046 (-0.244, 0.152) 
E2-W2 -0.043 (-0.239, 0.152) 0.032 (-0.164, 0.227) 
E3 0.137 (-0.048, 0.322) 0.057 (-0.128, 0.242) 
E4 0.119 (-0.077, 0.315) 0.019 (-0.177, 0.215) 
Table D3. Effect size estimates and 95% CI for the risk and ambiguity variants of the tasks. 
We finally complement our analysis using prediction intervals (Patil et al., 2016; Spence and 
Stanley, 2016). For each study, the prediction interval is calculated based on the effect size of the 
original study and the sample sizes of the original study and each replication attempt to provide a way 
to assess if the difference between the original and the replication result is consistent with what can be 
expected due to sample error alone (Patil et al., 2016; Spence and Stanley, 2016); that is, if the 
replication d-value differs from the original d-value only due to sampling error, there is a 95% chance 
the replication result will fall in this interval. In this analysis the 95% prediction interval is reported 
using the approach of Spence and Stanley (2016) that allows calculating of prediction intervals for 
standardized mean differences.2 Table D4 reports the results from the replication experiments. 
Eyeballing Table D4, two things emerge. First, we can see that most of the actual effect sizes reported 
in Table D3 fall within the prediction intervals of Table D4. Indeed, there are only two cases (the two 
replications of E2 in the risk variant) that fall outside the prediction interval based on the effect size of 
the original study. Second, we observe that all the prediction intervals are very wide from 
negative/close-to-zero values to positive and large values. The width of the prediction intervals depends 
on the sample size of both the original and the replication studies, and if either of them is small, the 
prediction interval will be wide and not very informative about replication success (Patil et al., 2016; 
Spence and Stanley, 2016).3  
                                                          
2 The analysis has been done using the web-based calculator created by Spence and Stanley (2016) available at 
https://replication.shinyapps.io/dvalue/ (2018, September 27). We use d=0.42 for the original study risk effect 
size (unrounded d= 0.4205341 and d=0.27 for the original study ambiguity effect size (unrounded d=0.2748002).  
3 If we increase the sample size ten times more than the original study (recruiting 850 for the positive and 770 
participants for the negative treatment), the prediction intervals would still not be very informative ((0.09, 0.75) 
for the risk and (-0.06, 0.59) for the ambiguity variant of the task).  
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 RISK AMBIGUITY 
Study  (95% PI)  (95% PI) 
E1  (0.03, 0.81)  (-0.12, 0.66) 
E2-W1  (0.05, 0.79)  (-0.10, 0.64) 
E2-W2  (0.05, 0.79)  (-0.10, 0.64) 
E3  (0.06, 0.78)  (-0.09, 0.63) 
E4  (0.05, 0.79)  (-0.10, 0.64) 
Table D4. Prediction intervals for the replication effect sizes 
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